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INTRODUCTION
It has long been noted that there is something unusual about the
way Americans think about political corruption.3 Americans are
substantially more likely than citizens of other Western
democracies to claim that their government is corrupt,4 yet they
are slightly less likely than residents of similar countries to claim
any firsthand experience with corruption.5 This is a disparity that
merits our concern: do Americans harbor a paranoid streak, or a
healthy skepticism about government? Or do we simply think
about corruption differently than do the citizens of other nations?
And what consequences does this disparity have for governance?
Bruce Cain argues convincingly that this disparity has its roots in
the artificial discussion that has been prompted by our Supreme
Court;6 forced to accept that preventing corruption is the sole
constitutionally permissible rationale for regulating political
spending, proponents of campaign finance reform have looked for
corruption everywhere, and in the process have twisted the word
so that it embraces a wide range of political and social phenomena
that other nations’ citizens might not regard as corrupt.7
Cain’s allegations are of particular relevance in today’s political
climate.8 Although we lack empirical evidence to prove this point,9
it seems apparent to us that there has been an increase over the
past few years in talk of corruption in American politics.10 Much of
3 See generally 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP
(Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-governmentcorruption.aspx (discussing perceptions of adults who view corruption as
pervasive over the past decade).
4 See generally William Tate, Gallup CEO: Belief that Current Government is
Corrupt Fuels Trump Popularity, AM. THINKER (Jan. 9, 2016),
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/01/gallup_ceo_belief_that_current_g
overnment_is_corrupt_fuels_trump_popularity.html (comparing the seventy-five
of the American public that believe their government is corrupt in comparison to
other Western democracies).
5 See generally LESLIE HOLMES, CORRUPTION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 78
(Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2015) (discussing comparative levels of
corruption between countries in North-Western Europe than those is SouthEastern Europe).
6
See generally BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S
POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 166 (Cambridge University Press 2015) (discussing
strategies to prevent corruption and achieve political equality).
7 See id. at 165–66.
8 See generally id. at 161 (discussing recent politics involving Hillary Clinton).
9 See generally id. at 2 (discussing examples of how political corruption is only
perceived in a particular way).
10 See generally id. (discussing how Americans have ranked public officials as
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this increase is due to the two related efforts: the establishment of
a research program on corruption undertaken by Harvard
University’s Edmond J. Safra Center on Ethics from 2009 to 2014,11
and the effort by legal scholars to develop a more expansive
definition of corruption12 so as to respond to the narrow quid pro
quo definition at the heart of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United
v. FEC decision.13 Perhaps because the Court has highlighted the
threat of corruption, both of these efforts, though largely led by
lawyers and legal scholars, seem to aim to expose types of alleged
corruption not captured by the word in its narrower legal or
criminal senses.14 At the same time, they implicitly assimilate
these other phenomena to criminal corruption, and the new,
broader sense of corruption seems to draw on the connotations of
the legal or criminal sense of corruption.15
Richard Briffault suggests that these efforts aim to
“dejudicialize” political finance—to reclaim from the courts a
degree of democratic control over our politics and to bring our
politics in line with the norms and values expressed in the
Constitution.16 Political finance is certainly not the only arena of
political contestation where this has been said to be a problem,17
but it provides a useful starting point. It may make sense for legal
negatively as car salesmen in recent years).
11 About,
EDMOND
J.
SAFRA
CTR.
FOR
ETHICS,
http://ethics.harvard.edu/pages/about (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Arthur
Applbaum, Lawrence Lessig Appointed New Center Director, EDMOND J. SAFRA
CTR. FOR ETHICS (Mar. 9, 2009), http://ethics.harvard.edu/news/lawrence-lessigappointed-new-center-director; New E-Books from Edmond J. Safra Research
Lab,
EDMOND J. SAFRA
CTR. FOR ETHICS
(June
30,
2015),
http://ethics.harvard.edu/news/new-e-books-edmond-j-safra-research-lab.
12 See generally CAIN, supra note 6, at 2, 164 (discussing the number of recent
books published on the topic of American politics and corruption and the different
definitions that corruption has been given).
13 See generally id. at 163 (discussing how the case mentioned is restrictive and
how campaign finance restricts material corruption).
14 See generally id. at 164 (discussing and distinguishing two types of
corruption between democratic distortion and material corruption).
15 See generally id. at 162–63 (discussing bribery and extortion as forms of
material corruption).
16 See Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law,
in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 175
(Monica Youn ed., 2011).
17 Consider, for instance, the meaning of the “well-regulated militia” of the
Second Amendment, the ongoing debate over whether the constitution grants,
without using the word, a right to privacy, or whether the “state” as specified in
the tenth amendment, should be construed as the state government or the people
of a state. U.S. CONST. amend. II; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See generally Briffault, supra note 16, at 174 (discussing the Constitution).
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scholars to use legal language in talking about such matters, but
it strikes us—a social scientist and a philosopher—as a bit odd to
adopt legal language if one wishes to wrest this particular
conversation away from the lawyers. If corruption is indeed a
serious problem in contemporary politics,18 we should talk about it
the way we want to talk amongst ourselves about it—we shouldn’t
just talk to the current or future Supreme Court about it. If, on
the other hand, there’s something else bothering us, we should call
that something by its proper name.
This article is our contribution to talking about how we should
talk about corruption: how Americans can have an honest
conversation about it, and how some of the more peculiar aspects
of the American conversation of late can be reconciled with the way
in which it has been discussed in other places and other times.19
We are not writing this as a defense of the Supreme Court’s stance
on corruption, nor are we seeking to challenge or justify any
particular set of regulations on political finance. We do, however,
wish to take seriously this “corruption talk,” or what John C.
Coates refers to as “the New New Corruption.”20 The two
endeavors we note above are linked in that the latter proposes to
broaden the definition of corruption for an immediate political
end,21 and the former proposes to apply the findings of a research
program on corruption in one sphere of society—elections22—and
broaden the definitions therein to include areas such as corporate
support for scientific research, banking laws, and other activities
that are not strictly governmental.23 If one wishes to broaden a
term, it is natural to look beyond the phenomena that prompted
this course of action, as a means of legitimating the enterprise to
one’s self and others.24 While there are clearly many rotten things
18 See generally CAIN, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing examples of published
materials that support the proposition that there is a current problem in
American politics).
19 See infra notes 179–337 and accompanying text.
20 See John C. Coates, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History,
Data, and Implications 31 (Feb. 27, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Harvard University Law School).
21 See generally id. at 33 (discussing some definitions of corruption that achieve
political influence).
22 See generally id. at 32 (quoting Justice Kennedy in an opinion discussing
how elected officials can succumb to corruption as a result of improper influences).
23 See generally id. at 33, 38–39 (discussing how the court’s definition of
corruption is too narrow).
24 See generally id. at 33 (discussing a theoretical approach to broaden the
definition of corruption through having a vision).
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afoot in United States and the rest of the world the idea that a
word can simply be redefined to advance one’s goals is, as we shall
argue, problematic. Perhaps the Court has left reform advocates
no alternative rhetorical strategy here,25 but to assert this merely
shifts the blame; it does not mitigate the consequences.
This is so because corruption, as a term, has three important
qualities. First, corruption is a loaded word.26 Although, as we
discuss below, we disagree with some elements of Laura
Underkuffler’s argument,27 we agree with her that to call someone
corrupt is to make a categorical, moral statement about that
person’s character.28 Underkuffler finds this to be problematic in
a legal sense—it is a moral term, she says, that is ill suited to a
system that evaluates actions, not character.29 We are more
concerned with the political or rhetorical ramifications of
corruption. To label someone corrupt is to delegitimize that
person’s actions, goals, or political views.30 It is perhaps more
delegitimizing than to accuse one of racism, sexism, or any other
“ism,” insofar as these “isms” presuppose a value structure, even if
it is a wrong or morally objectionable one.31 Or to put matters in
other terms, one might atone for one’s past racist or sexist acts, but
to label someone as being corrupt is to contend that whatever
argument that person makes will be self-serving, disingenuous—
not to be taken at face value. In many instances, such conclusions
are likely warranted—there are no doubt many corrupt politicians
who have concocted creative but entirely false arguments to justify
their plunder.32 It may be possible, in an attempt to avoid the
loaded moral connotations of the word, to separate individuals
from institutions—that is, to argue that a system, process, or
institution is corrupt or corrupting but that the individuals within
it are not corrupt.33 Yet it seems plausible to respond that
25 See generally id. at 32 (discussing how a binding court decision has narrowed
the definition of corruption).
26 See Coates, supra note 20, at 31–32.
27 See generally LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, CAPTURED BY EVIL: THE IDEA OF
CORRUPTION IN LAW 7 (2013) (discussing one part of Laura’s argument
surrounding corruption).
28 See generally id. at 8 (discussing the substantive theory of corruption).
29 See id. at 13–14.
30 See generally id. at 139–40 (discussing corruption as a breach of duty).
31 See generally id. at 139 (discussing and distinguishing a difference between
illegality and corruption).
32 See, e.g., id. at 140, 143 (discussing the notion of the corrupt politician and
examples of such).
33 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 140.
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individuals within that system remain complicit in that corruption
or that those who wish to condemn institutions but not their agents
are naïve about the innocence of the institutional agents or their
ability to rise above its corruption.34
Second, virtually all of those who study corruption begin from
the same point: that its precise definition is in dispute.35 For
instance, Lowenstein refers to corruption as an “essentially
contested concept” with no clear boundary.36 Johnston and
Klitgaard both note that the definition of corruption is necessarily
imprecise because it is culturally determined and hence varies
from one culture to the next.37 Yet most of the literature that
begins from such claims proceeds to document activities that any
reasonable person would conclude are corrupt—or, at least, are bad
things that one should avoid.38
Much of the empirical
anticorruption research agenda addresses behaviors that are
undoubtedly corrupt,39 and we would not question the motives of
one who seeks to find ways to prevent, for instance, the sorts of
widespread vote buying, bribe taking, or price fixing that are
rampant in many political regimes.40 We have little quarrel, in
addition, with the enterprise of identifying and quantifying the
world’s most corrupt political regimes.41 Even without an airtight
definition of corruption, the empirical research on these countries
seems to us to show that they are rotten places to live.42 In some
instances, corruption is like pornography—we know it when we see
it.43 The sheer volume of efforts to define and redefine corruption,
however, suggests that demarcating the boundaries of it is more

34 See generally Coates, supra note 20, at 30–31 (discussing Vermont’s
Attorney General’s decision to condemn employees and management in Vermont’s
legal department).
35 See MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND
DEMOCRACY 11 (Cambridge University Press 2005).
36 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 851 (1985).
37 ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 3 (University of California
Press, 1988); see JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11.
38 See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 3 (describing four syndromes reflecting
commonly found combinations of corruption).
39 See id. at 18.
40 See id. at 17–18.
41 See
Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
42 Id.
43 Claire Berlinski, The Dark Figure of Corruption, HOOVER INST. (May 29,
2009), http://www.hoover.org/research/dark-figure-corruption.
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important than is doing so for other politically disputed terms.44
Third, corruption is in some ways what public opinion
researchers refer to as a “valence issue.”45 Although it is not (as
per the first characteristic above) easily scalable (as valence issues
such as competence, integrity, honesty, and so forth are), it is, like
these examples, nonideological.46 No one, left or right, advocates
for corruption.47 Despite the ambiguity of the term around the
edges,48 there is often agreement in recognizing certain types of
action as corrupt.49 Once a behavior can be defined as corrupt,
political foes can join in their condemnation of it.50 In a political
environment as polarized as that of the contemporary United
States,51 such an opportunity is not to be taken lightly. Although
the two efforts we reference above originate from the political left,52
it is important to note that corruption has been central to political
arguments, both theoretical and practical, among American
conservatives as well.53 A shared language regarding corruption
poses the tantalizing possibility of a policy agenda that can avoid
the partisan gridlock that has characterized so much of American
politics over the past two decades.54
As a consequence, expanding the definition of corruption—
redefining corruption, rather than clarifying it—can, we would
argue, be harmful.55 Much of the recent American effort of late has,
as we shall demonstrate, sought to recast legal but distasteful (or
degrading) activities as corrupt or corrupting.56 Such a focus risks
See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11.
See Donald E. Stokes, Spatial Models of Party Competition, 57 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 368, 373 (1963) (Valence issues, as articulated by Stokes, are issues where
all voters share an ideal point; such issues include honesty, competence, or
morality).
46 Id. at 372–73.
47 See id. at 372.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 372–73 (discussing that when evidence of malfeasance turned up
in the Democratic Party, many voters felt the party had strayed from virtue).
50 See id. at 372–73.
51 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 2.
52 See RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND
POLITICAL POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 153 (2015).
53 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 2; STOKES, supra note 45, at 372.
54 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 2.
55 See generally ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 197–98 (2014) (discussing the lack of trust in government to
create reform without partisan political intentions and citing to past reform
scandals).
56 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 11; supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
44
45
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politicizing the issue, thereby casting into doubt the things that
have not been contested.57 In other words, if corruption becomes a
matter of partisan or ideological contestation, this can render
research into the really bad stuff suspect.58 Such an effort can also
risk turning matters of scale (such as political contributions or
lobbying restrictions in the political world, limitations on grantsupported research in academia, or gift-giving and its concomitant
attached strings in virtually every walk of life) into categorical
issues, or turning political, ethical, or moral decisions into legal
ones.59 We concur with Robert Mutch that much of what gets
subsumed by contemporary American corruption talk is properly
political;60 it reflects enduring disagreements about American
values that cannot be adjudicated by the courts.61
Our argument, in a nutshell is this: it is clear what those who
discuss corruption in contemporary American politics mean.62 But
they misuse the term: they are not, in fact, talking about
corruption as it is commonly understood in contemporary
America.63 And while this new meaning is clear, there are
underlying philosophical problems with it, problems that (a)
render the definitional attempts confused about how corruption
within an institution works, and (b) hinder constructive discourse
about the underlying problems that have prompted contemporary
American “corruption talk.”64 Accordingly, in this paper we
describe the contours of contemporary corruption talk; we
demonstrate the novelty of such claims; and we outline our
concerns about this talk as philosophical project and rhetorical
tool.

57 See MUTCH, supra note 55, at 198 (explaining that politicizing the issue can
lead to dysfunction and an inability to reform).
58 Id. (describing the risk of partisan gridlock).
59 See id. at 197 (discussing how Bellotti and Citizens United politicized reform
efforts and the history of economic, social, political, and cultural differences in the
country which have maintained a fault line in our politics).
60 See MUTCH, supra note 55, at 184.
61 See id.
62 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 2–3.
63 See id. at 11; JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 18 (showing examples of the term
corruption).
64 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (definition problems); supra
notes 62–63 and accompanying text (confusion); infra notes 65–68 and
accompanying text (American corruption talk).
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AMERICAN CORRUPTION TALK

The contemporary era of “corruption talk” can be traced back to
the Supreme Court’s Buckley v. Valeo decision,65 and to three
distinct definitions of corruption that have dominated American
political discourse since that time.66 While these definitions have
been intertwined with the debate over money in politics,67 the
stakes here and the formulation of them are somewhat larger.68
Nonetheless, let us start with the Court.
A. The Political Story
In Buckley, the Supreme Court famously equated political
spending with speech and responded to recently passed campaign
finance legislation by declaring that the prevention of “corruption
or the appearance of corruption”69 was the only legitimate reason
for restrictions on such speech; it declared that other plausible
goals, such as equality, limiting the role of money, or allowing for
a diversity of voices were not constitutionally permissible.70 There,
and in subsequent decisions,71 the Court went on to develop a
definition of corruption that was limited to instances of direct quid
pro quo corruption—that is, instances where the corrupted was an
individual politician.72 The Court would go on, as well, to largely
abandon its concern about the appearance of corruption.73 The
problem here was that if we regard the public as the ultimate
arbiter of what appears to be corrupt, then virtually any
governmental action is suspect—surveys have shown that not only
do most Americans (and residents of other nations, as well) believe
politicians to be corrupt, but that no change in election regulation
has any effect on that belief. So there’s not much government can
do to make itself appear less corrupt.74
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976); MUTCH, supra note 55, at 9–10.
See CAIN, supra note 6, at 163–64.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–47 (1976) (explaining that limits on independent
expenditures do not prevent “corruption [or] the appearance of corruption”).
70 Id. at 19–21, 25.
71 Id. at 246; see MUTCH, supra note 55, at 192. (discussing that Citizens United
further narrowed the Court’s definition of corruption).
72 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27, 246.
73 Id. at 45.
74 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 4–5 (discussing that laws cannot be
made to address issues of this nature, such as cultural and emotional).
65
66
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The Court’s definition has been adopted and elaborated upon by
anti-regulation writers such as Bradley Smith and John Samples.75
It presents a view of a legislature not as an institution but as a
collection of individuals; to make a claim that an institution is
corrupt, one would have to demonstrate that many, if not all,
members of that institution are corrupt.76 There have since this
time been two plausible responses to Buckley: to challenge the idea
that corruption is what matters, or to challenge the definition of
corruption.77 While both approaches have proven to be largely
futile, to date, for advocates of regulation,78 there is ample history
to suggest that the second approach has always seemed a bit more
plausible if one’s goal is to win in the courts.79 It is not uncommon
for the court to reject legislation but then to go on to counsel
Congress on how it might achieve similar ends by slightly
reframing its goals.80 Proponents of the most comprehensive postBuckley campaign finance legislation, the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, did just this, making direct reference to the prevention
of corruption and assembling a lengthy record of statements by
political contributors on the potentially corrupting nature of their
activities.81
There is, perhaps, something fundamentally
disingenuous in presenting such comprehensive legislation as an
anti-corruption measure, but the court’s rules were clear.82
The so-called “new corruption” arguments that were presented
in the 1980s and 1990s in the legal community, sought to present
an alternate understanding of corruption that allowed for

75 See JOHN C. SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 65–66
(University of Chicago Press 2006); BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY
OF CAMPAIGN 123 (Princeton University Press 2001).
76 SMITH, supra note 75, at 215 (discussing corruption of a system which allows
law makers to determine who can spend money, and how much).
77 See id. at 123 (breakdown of the Court’s Buckley ruling demonstrating its
implications and reactions to the ruling).
78 See generally id. at 18, 20 (giving a brief history of campaign spending,
regulation, and reform during a time that corruption was not seen to be a threat,
discussing an act which prevented abuse of power by elected officials but which
was not created until nearly the 20th century).
79 See generally id. at 18, 20 (creating an act through Congress creates
regulations which could be upheld or struck down by the Court in creating a
definition or standard for corruption).
80 See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 589–90 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (the Court rejected California’s blanket primary law yet instructed
the state on how to write a new, constitutionally permissible law that essentially
created the same system).
81 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132–33 (2003).
82 See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 589–90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

DO NOT DELETE

2016]

5/16/2016 6:38 PM

THE POVERTY OF “CORRUPTION”

351

prophylactic measures—efforts to prevent harm to an institution
itself by making it clear that suspect individual transactions are
prohibited.83 Under this understanding of corruption, proof of a
quid pro quo transaction is not required;84 if the practices of an
institution are deemed by the public to be corrupt, then this is
ample reason to take steps to prevent them from happening.85
Instances of quid pro quo corruption can still be identified and
punished, but laws that remove the temptation to engage in such
corruption86—laws that, for instance, limit contacts between
legislators and lobbyists or limit unregulated contributions87—can
be implemented without proof that corruption has occurred as a
result of such actions or would occur in the absence of regulation.88
Many prophylactic measures of this nature have been quite
popular with the public.89 In Citizens United, however, the court
held that “influence, gratitude, or access” are not equivalent to
corruption in the sense they hold to be relevant for limiting
political speech through independent expenditures.90 As long as no
explicit agreement has been made between the spender and the
politician, this is not corrupt. This holding has established an
almost insurmountable barrier for those who would allege
corruption in campaign financing.91 At the same time, more easily
identifiable instances of individual corruption have shown that the
obvious examples of individual corruption stand far outside of
conventional political squabbles.92
B. Bigger than Politics
So much for the legal story about corruption in campaign
finance. American discussions about corruption have never just
83 See IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING
MONEY IN POLITICS 182–83 (Joshua E. Rosenkranz ed., 1999) [hereinafter IF
BUCKLEY FELL].
84 Id.
85 See id. at 183–84.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 184.
88 Id.
89 See IF BUCKLEY FELL, supra note 83, at 95.
90 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 355–59 (2010).
91 See id.
92 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT XII (2012) (debating that the academic view of
corruption showcases the danger in a light not easily identifiable while the
activist creates extremes that are not always relevant to politics but instead truly
individual) [hereinafter REPUBLIC, LOST].
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been about electoral politics, and in the past several years a
growing number of writers on the left (mostly) and the right have
sought to articulate a broader argument about corruption.93 While
the Court may have inspired some of this, one might contend that
the Court is no longer the intended audience of this discussion.94
And although the principals in this discussion have mostly been
law professors, the argument is hardly a legal one. It has sought
to tap into larger American concerns—it is not merely that our
politicians might be beholden to lobbyists or wealthy donors, it is
that Americans have become increasingly disenchanted with
politics,95 that America’s standing on a variety of cross-national
indicators of well-being has fallen, and that our government seems
less capable of addressing problems today that it was in prior
decades.96 Might this because of “corruption” in a more epic sense?
Or its consequence?
It seems to us that there are currently three different theories of
corruption on the loose in American politics.97 None of these is that
of the Court;98 although the Court perhaps instigated the
corruption debate, its definition is sufficiently minimalist that
there have been few serious efforts to elaborate upon it.99
The most prominent theory of corruption today is associated
with Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig, who has sought to
articulate a theory of what he alternately refers to as institutional
corruption, or “dependence corruption.”100 Whereas individual
corruption, for Lessig, is essentially a quid pro quo exchange in
which a public official seeks some sort of personal benefit in
exchange for provision of a private benefit to someone outside of
government, institutional corruption occurs when a system tends
to promote private interests due to influence, rather than deals.101
Institutional corruption is characterized by improper
93 See SMITH, supra note 75, at 123 (discussing how the Court has denied a
broader definition of corruption while implying this would be a topic worth
discussion). See generally SAMPLES, supra note 75, at 257 (discussing how
corruption can be in politics even if not involved in the election process).
94 See IF BUCKLEY FELL, supra note 83, at 68–69 (explaining legislative ideas
for campaign financing reform).
95 See supra notes 3–5, 10–14 and accompanying text.
96 Id.
97 See IF BUCKLEY FELL, supra note 83, at 182–84.
98 See id.
99 Id. (implying that the categories within the article were created because of
the lack of clarity and intrusiveness into the matter by the Court).
100 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 16–17.
101 Id. at 15–17.
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dependence.102 That is, contemporary social science might predict
that self-interested politicians seek to stay in office, and in doing
so they provide benefits to voters or blocs of voters.103 There is
nothing noble in this, but if we believe that votes are a means of
ensuring accountability and that winning votes is a way of seeking
the common good, this may not seem corrupt.104 The institution is
working as it is supposed to.105 If, on the other hand, government
officials are dependent upon something other than votes—
“funders,” perhaps106—for their well-being, and are providing
benefits to them rather than to voters, then the institution is not
dependent in the manner that we expect it to be.107 The institution
is corrupt, regardless of the culpability of individual members in
corrupt deals.108 Individual politicians might all regret this
occurrence, and they might even speak out against it, but they
nonetheless will need to cater to donors rather than voters
(perhaps viewing themselves as better or more ethical than those
who might replace them).109 An institution can be corrupt, for
Lessig, when its members are influenced improperly, even if we
cannot punish individual members for corrupt deals.110
Lessig has openly drawn upon the work of Dennis Thompson,
but there is a crucial difference.111 In his early work on Ethics in
Congress, Thompson sought to distinguish between individual
corruption, in which a legislator exchanged favor for personal
benefit, and institutional corruption, in which a legislator
exchanged favors for political benefit.112 Thompson argued that

Id. at 17.
See generally id. at 15–16 (illustrating allegorically how a doctor’s decisionmaking may be compromised through receipt of benefits and implying similar
results would occur in the case of a politician).
104 See id. at 16 (illustrating the choices made by doctors and a conception of
corruption).
105 See id. at 16–17.
106 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 16–18 (arguing that if the benefits
received alter the official to be concerned with only the gift providers well being,
then the corruption is not the level of dependency expected).
107 Id. at 15–18.
108 Id. at 15.
109 Id. at 15–16.
110 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16 (explaining that the influence
on a member of an institution may result in the corruption of the institution
without the individual actually being corrupt and therefore not liable for
punishment).
111 See id. at 328.
112 See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 7 (1995).
102
103
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institutional corruption is ultimately more difficult to identify and
prosecute, insofar as it often does not yield corrupt results and is
not always easily distinguishable from accepted behavior.113 He
insists, however, that instances of institutional corruption are
individual acts that are “mediated” by the practices of the
institution.114 Institutional corruption may bring the norms and
practices of the institution into question, but for Thompson, it is
ultimately an action of individuals (whom he lists in an appendix
to his book).115 Lessig, on the other hand, although he reiterates
Thompson’s distinction, emphasizes that he does not wish to single
out individuals.116 It is the institution of Congress, itself, that is
corrupt.117 In Republic, Lost, he writes that
This corruption has two elements, each of which feeds the other.
The first element is bad governance, which means simply that our
government doesn’t track the expressed will of the people . . . . The
second element is lost trust: when democracy seems a charade, we
lose faith in its process.118

It is hard to imagine listing the perpetrators of this corruption—
which is much of Lessig’s point.
The turn in Lessig’s story is necessary because he is not talking
only about Congress, and he is not talking only to the Court.119 He
is not interested in a legal case, but in fostering dialogue.120 He
makes this explicit in his Randy L. and Melvin R. Berlin Family
Lectures, delivered in 2014 and 2015, at the University of
Chicago.121 There, he summarizes much of the research he and
others pursued at the Safra Center, where he served as the director

Id. at 7–8.
See id. at 7 (describing the ways in which corrupt political institutions can
be regulated by members’ actions).
115 Id. at 7–8, 182–90.
116 See Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruptions 5–6, 15 (Edmond J. Safra
Research Lab at Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 1, 2013)[hereinafter Lessig,
Institutional Corruptions].
117 Id. at 4, 15.
118 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 8–9.
119 See id. at 227–28 (discussing both legislative and judiciary powers to
prevent and deal with corruption).
120 See id. (discussing the way corruption can be dealt with through the
branches of government, and the powers required to effectively deal with it).
121 See Video: Lawrence Lessig, America: Compromised Studies in Institutional
Corruption, RANDY L. & MELVIN R. BERLIN FAMILY LECTURES AT THE UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO
(Oct.
16–Nov.
13,
2014),
OF
https://berlinfamilylectures.uchicago.edu/2014-lawrence-lessig
[hereinafter
Berlin].
113
114
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from 1987 to 2009.122 He proposes a definition of corruption as
“influence within an economy of influence that illegitimately
weakens the effectiveness of an institution, especially by
weakening the public trust of the institution.”123 Whatever one
thinks of the specifics of this definition (and we will consider these
later), the intent here is clear—it can be applied, as Lessig proceeds
to do, to a variety of different types of institutions, including the
academy, the financial industry, and the media.124 There is no
pretense that we are telling the Supreme Court who is corrupt; the
intention, rather, is to develop a unified theory.125 Lessig clearly
does document, both here and in the Safra Center work, a variety
of ills that have befallen these institutions.126 Yet, as with
government, the extent to which these ills constitute “corruption”
according to this definition is determined by the appropriate
dependency relationship or purpose.127
The other principal articulator of this expanded theory of
corruption has been Fordham University law professor Zephyr
Teachout.128
In Corruption in America, Teachout connects
contemporary disputes over money in politics to the historical
treatment of corruption in American political thought.129 Like
Lessig, she argues for a more expansive, extra-legal view of
corruption,130 but unlike Lessig, she explicitly locates this view in
most references to corruption in eighteenth and nineteenth
century American thought.131 Teachout notes that American
“corruption talk” has historically had to do with the perversion of
discourse that might occur, for instance, if foreign interests were
122 Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption 2 (Edmond J. Safra
Center for Ethics at Harvard University) (Working Paper No. 16, 2013); see
Berlin, supra note 121.
123 Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2.
124 Berlin, supra note 121.
125 Id.
126 See Berlin, supra note 121; Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note
116, at 4.
127 See Berlin, supra note 121; Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note
116, at 17.
128 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 2 (Harvard University Press, 2014);
Zephyr
Teachout,
FORDHAM
UNIV.
SCH.
OF
LAW,
https://www.fordham.edu/info/23186/zephyr_teachout (last visited Mar. 29,
2016).
129 TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 2–4 (explaining that the historical fear of
monetary corruption is the same that exists in contemporary politics).
130 See id. at 3–4.
131 See id. at 2–3, 14.
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able to insert themselves into American politics.132 The corruption
inherent here is one of duplicity,133 in that the influences behind a
particular argument would not be known, and, as in Lessig’s case,
one of improper dependency.134 While Teachout distinguishes
corruption from dependency,135 she concludes that improper
dependency can lead to corruption (of an institution or of a
people),136 and that one solution to this is “bright line” prophylactic
laws, which both deter corrupt behavior and send a clear signal
about the “moral weight” of the law itself.137
For both Lessig and Teachout, (but not for Thompson) defining
corruption and establishing a dichotomous view of corruption—
either it is an individual or an institutional trait—is crucial.138
Neither disputes that individual, i.e., venal or quid pro quo,
corruption exists,139 but both emphasize that that is not what they
are talking about—and moreover, in Teachout’s case, that that is
not what the Founders were talking about.140 Teachout’s more
historical approach to corruption calls our attention to differences
between contemporary corruption talk and the American reference
points we often use in that talk,141 but it is, like Lessig’s book, very
much an attempt to reintroduce and expand the concept in
contemporary politics.142 It is important to note that in this latter
132 Id. at 3–4 (explaining that corruption through diplomats would allow
foreign interests to enter into and potentially disrupt the American political
system).
133 Id. at 15–16 (explaining the different sides of Franklin’s beliefs and the
corruption possible).
134 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 17; TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 15–16
(illustrating how the example of Jefferson keeping the diamonds showcases a
dependency on a foreign government unknown to Congress).
135 See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 16, 45 (describing how there
was a fear of corruption through dependency as well as a fear of general
corruption created through foreign interests).
136 See generally id. at 15–16, 45 (explaining the possibility that one who
become dependent on foreign interests will create a corrupt institution to continue
receiving benefits from that interest).
137 Id. at 184.
138 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 14; see Berlin, supra note 121, at 5.
139 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 7, 10; see Berlin, supra note 121, at 5
(clearly stating the dichotomy of corruption).
140 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 10 (discussing the history of corruption
in politics from the ratification of the Constitution).
141 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 18 (discussing the reason behind a
portion of the Constitution); TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 38, 39 (explaining that
the way in which corruption was described during the creation of the nation bears
similar comparisons at times to remarks made in current political debates).
142 See LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST supra note 92, at 18; TEACHOUT, supra note 128,
at 38, 39 (explaining that the description of corruption during the Founders time
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regard, Lessig and Teachout (both of whom have a long track
record of advocacy for left-leaning Democratic candidates)143 have
actively sought out areas of agreement with conservative writers
such as Jay Cost and Peter Schweizer.144 As Teachout, in
particular, shows, the left in no way owns the idea that political
institutions can be corrupted.145
A second opposing theory of corruption is offered by Cornell Law
Professor, Laura Underkuffler.146
In Captured by Evil,
Underkuffler provides a survey of definitions of corruption in
theoretical and empirical research.147
She concludes that
references to corruption virtually always are used to make moral
judgments about an individual’s character.148 It is a moral,

still matches to the public thought of corruption in today’s world).
143 Brian Tumulty, Zephyr Teachout will Run in 19th Congressional District,
J.
(Jan.
25,
2016),
POUGHKEEPSIE
http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/story/news/local/newyork/2016/01/25/zephyr-teachout-running-congress-19th-cd/79302000/ (reporting
that Teachout is an active member of the Democratic political party and currently
running for a Congressional seat); Alan Rappeport, Lawrence Lessig’s Presidential
Bid Endures in Relative Obscurity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2015, at A17,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/us/politics/lawrence-lessigs-presidential-bidendures-in-relative-obscurity.html (reporting that Lessig intended to run as a
Democrat in the 2016 presidential election).
144 See JAY COST, A REPUBLIC NO MORE: BIG GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL CORRUPTION xi-xii (2015) (explaining the premise of the book,
in that corruption exists within governmental institutions and elected officials);
PETER SCHWEIZER, CLINTON CASH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW AND WHY FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND BUSINESSES HELPED MAKE BILL AND HILLARY RICH 2–3, 17
(2015) (describing the way in which the Clinton family has amassed their fortune
as questionably corrupt given the possible abuse of power); TEACHOUT, supra note
128, at 14–16 (describing generally the layout of the book and the way in which
the topic of corruption will be discussed which is politically neutral given the
historical framing); Lawrence Lessig, Democrats Embrace the Logic of Citizens
United,
WASHINGTON
POST
(May
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-clintons-citizens-united-and-21stcentury-corruption/2015/05/08/7f11a0d6-f57b-11e4-b2f3af5479e6bbdd_story.html.
145 TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 14–16 (describing corruption in general, and
the history of political corruption in the U.S. was in no way controlled or tempered
by one party or another, but rather by all, citing James Madison, Ben Franklin,
and Thomas Jefferson and their thoughts on corruption, given the historical
viewpoint of the book).
146 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 5; Faculty, CORNELL LAW SCH.,
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio_laura_underkuffler.cfm (last visited
Apr. 13, 2016); supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
147 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 2.
148 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 2; supra notes 2–34 and accompanying
text.
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dispositional concept, and as such is unsuitable for use in law.149
One cannot commit a corrupt act without being a corrupt person.150
The moral taint associated with corruption suggests that one is
unsuited to engage in politics or public life at all—one’s actions
simply cannot be trusted.151 Such corruption certainly exists, but
for Underkuffler the accusation of corruption must be used
sparingly.152
If corruption implies “evil,” one is effectively
banishing one’s antagonist from the political sphere when one
levels the accusation.153 Furthermore, the institutional argument
runs into problems here: can an institution be evil, or captured by
evil?154
Is it possible to sustain an individual/institutional
distinction where one effectively argues “the institution is evil but
its members are not”?155 Underkuffler does not provide any
conclusive evidence that she is right (or that Lessig is wrong),156
but her argument at a minimum provides enough historical detail
to convince that the connotations of talking about corruption are
at odds with Lessig’s task and render that task problematic.157
Underkuffler’s notion of individual corruption requires no quid or
quo;158 there are people who would engage in quid pro quo
corruption, but it does not matter if they actually have.159 There
are, furthermore, people who engaged in minor instances of
individual corruption but have revealed themselves as the sort of
people who would do far worse if they could get away with it.160
A third theoretical approach to corruption is presented in the
work of Bruce Cain and Nancy Rosenblum.161 Neither Cain nor
149 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 3–5 (describing how a moral subject can
not easily be explained or regulated through law).
150 See id. (explaining that a corrupt act can be seen as evil, and an evil act can
therefore only be done by an evil person, a corrupt person will perform a corrupt
act and thus the inverse is true).
151 See id. at 4, 6 (discussing how a corrupt official can not be trusted to serve
in their positions).
152 See id. at 4–5 (describing why corrupt is not the proper description given
the various moral issues which can be created by its usage).
153 See generally REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 5–6 (noting how
progressives at the turn of the century attacked political entities they saw as
being corrupt).
154 See generally id. at 15–16 (proposing that if one doctor is corrupt that the
whole institution of medicine is not).
155 Id. at 15.
156 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 212.
157 See id. at 7.
158 See supra notes 146–52 and accompanying text.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168; see also NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE
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Rosenblum bill their efforts as being exclusively about corruption,
and neither disputes the notion that there is a difference between
institutional and individual corruption.162 Both share a broader
theoretical orientation which Cain identifies as “reform
pluralis[m].”163 In Cain’s argument, however, there are in fact a
number of different ways to talk about corruption.164 There is room
for talk of a “corruption of democratic ideals” (which is what he
takes Lessig to be talking about),165 there is room for talk of
inappropriate dependence (which is what Lessig takes himself to
be discussing)166 and there is also room for talk of a corruption as a
“debasement of public deliberation”167 in which self-serving
arguments are deceptively framed as appeals to public ideals.168
Likewise, Rosenblum catalogs the various ways in which
“corruption” is used as an umbrella term to cover “implicit
understandings, ambiguous favors, and political advantage.”169 At
some point the definition of corruption may be expanded to the
point of meaninglessness. This is a problem because the audience
for corruption talk maintains the sort of “gut” response to the word
that Underkuffler describes.170
Cain’s argument is also taken up by La Raja and Schaffner in
their argument for strengthening the capacity of political parties
to influence elections.171 For La Raja and Schaffner, there is a
trade-off to be made between addressing corruption and
addressing political polarization; one cannot do both, and given the
ambiguity of the term corruption, it can be applied to all manner
of political ills.172 The anticorruption agenda, however, has focused
so narrowly on the allegedly corrosive effect of money in politics
that it has crowded out concerns such as “fairness, stability, and
accountability,”173 concerns that are not easily reconciled with
OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP 172 (2008).
162 CAIN, supra note 6, at 168; ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 172.
163 CAIN, supra note 6, at 168–69.

Id. at 164.
Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 212.
170 See generally UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 144 (noting that the
emotional reaction to a politician’s corrupt acts may be toward the idea of the
politician’s corruption rather than to the act itself).
171 See LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 52, at 152.
172 Id.
173 Id.
164
165
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existing campaign finance regulation proposals.174 Even if the
court does not see these as legitimate reasons to abridge
constitutional rights, they can still serve as rationales for some
types of laws, and they are, in addition, valid starting points for
political conversation.175
Unlike Underkuffler, and like Lessig, however, a pluralist
theory of corruption would admit that political actors are, at least
in part, self-interested—and if that alone can constitute
corruption, then it might be plausible to argue that we are all a
little bit corrupt.176
Cain and Rosenblum both prescribe
aggregation as a means of combatting corruption;177 the premier
aggregative institutions in American politics are, and always have
been, political parties and reputation-bearing interest groups.178
Given the priors we bring to any discussion of corruption, it is hard
to talk about institutional corruption if one is a pluralist; one
cannot describe political parties or interest groups as corrupt and
then suggest that these things be strengthened.179 The same would
seem to apply to arguments about other allegedly corrupt
institutions—if the institution is corrupt, why should it be
strengthened or why would enhancing intermediate institutions be
an appropriate palliative?
There is a perhaps unintentional irony to the development of
recent arguments about corruption. As Teachout notes, and as
Wallis documents, the story about corruption propounded by moral
reformers during the nineteenth century was the one most likely
to emphasize institutional or systemic corruption—it posited an
uncorrupted American ideal rooted in the founding, in Christian
values, or in the agrarian, antebellum American ideal, and
presented early 20th century America, with political machines and
vote-seeking career politicians as a corruption of that ideal.180 The
Id. at 153.
See id.
176 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 122; ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 252.
177 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168; ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 299.
178 That is, well-known groups that expect to remain active across multiple
elections. See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168–69 (noting that reform movements would
have been better off aggregating their contributions within the established
political parties or large political action committees (“PACs”)); Robert G.
Boatright, Campaign Finance Law and Functional Differentiation among
Nonparty Groups in the United States, in THE DEREGULATORY MOMENT?
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CHANGING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 71, 99–101
(Robert G. Boatright ed., forthcoming 2016).
179 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168.
180 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128; John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of
174
175
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Progressive argument about corruption may have been inspired by
similar circumstances, but took aim at individual politicians and
posited prophylactic measures—primary elections, the Australian
ballot, and so forth—as means of preventing individual
corruption.181 In some ways the contemporary alignment has
matters backwards; it is self-styled modern progressives (with a
small “p”) who have championed the nineteenth century
conservative view,182 albeit without as clear a reference point, and
it is today’s conservatives who have argued that individual
corruption is the major subject of concern (with the caveat the
prophylactic measures have been shown not to work very well).183
To summarize, the contemporary discussion about corruption
can be understood in part as a response to the U.S. Supreme
Court,184 but it represents an acknowledgment that the Court is not
listening, and that the appropriate audience is someone else – the
legal advocates of tomorrow, members of the opposing party, or
simply the public.185 It is easy to conclude that the institutional
corruption argument championed by Lessig is “winning”—it has
frequently been written about,186 it prompted a presidential
campaign,187 and it has the clearest political implications,188 and yet
its implications are not reflexively partisan in nature.189 But this
facility is, for those who articulate opposing views, precisely the
problem.190 The fact that this definition does not appear to “fit” our
priors about what corruption is (even if the Supreme Court’s
definition does not, either) and the fact that it purports to be a
redefinition or at least a rediscovery of a lost word suggests that
this thing, however lamentable, that many people today are calling
Systematic Corruption in American History, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS
AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 32, 50–55 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia
Goldin eds., 2006).
181 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 180; Wallis, supra note 175, at 52–54.
182 See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 9 (noting that “an act is corrupt
when private interests trump public ones in the exercise of public power”).
183 See generally id. at 7 (noting that both Justices Kennedy and Roberts, in
separate opinions, determined that corruption was only quid pro quo).
184 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 4142–43 (1976).
185 See supra text and accompanying notes 65–178.
186 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 92, at 15–16.
187 See id. at 4; see also LESSIG, https://lessig2016.us/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2016)
(Democratic Presidential Campaign).
188 See id. at 7–9.
189 See generally id. at 7 (noting Lessig’s intent as being to rally Republicans
and Democrats against a corrupt system).
190 See LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 52, at 153 (noting the difference
between the Democratic and Republican parties’ views on campaign finance).
FROM
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corruption is not, in fact, corruption.191
II.

CONFUSIONS

We contend—and we have explained this contention at length
elsewhere—that in virtually all political, moral, and religious
definitions of corruption, there is a broad agreement that corrupt
action shows a turning away of the agent from his proper ends or
function, for the sake of serving other, often lower and more selfish,
goods (e.g., money, power, honor) or a partial interest rather than
a common good.192 This general framework can encompass a wide
variety of actions, but ultimately it is not the action itself that is of
principal concern. Although the legal category targets,193 as it
must, particular criminal acts, the reason citizens take single acts
of criminal corruption so seriously is that we see them as
indications of something less isolated and more damaging.194 The
guilt of criminal corruption has the psychological and political
effect of covering the person categorically and permanently:195 the
person is stained. Thus, a single action, though the legal target, is
not primarily the social concern when an accusation of corruption
is made.196 Rather, the corrupt act is taken as a symptom of the
corruption of the person.197 An inward truth about the agent has
pierced through his public show: the particular act of turning away
indicates a condition, an established character, consisting in the
agent’s perhaps habitual orientation toward these other interests,
proving the agent a false or at least undependable servant of his
proper ends.198 It is the process of turning away that precedes the
191 See M.E. Newhouse, Institutional Corruption: A Fiduciary Theory, 23
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 554–55, 594 (2013) (discussing the various
definitions and interpretations of institutional corruption and the impacts made
on the political system).
192 See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11; Robert G. Boatright & Molly B. Flynn,
Confusions and Disagreements about the Rotten in Politics, in CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE (Jonathan
Mendilow & Ilan Peleg eds., forthcoming 2016) (galleries on file with author).
193 See
Political
Corruption,
FBI.GOV,
https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/corruption (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
194 See generally JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11 (discussing how the social
significance of corruption is cultural and public opinion of corruption can affect
the definition in a way which views the corrupt act as more serious).
195 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 55.
196 See id. at 55–56 (demonstrating Spiro Agnew’s demise as a bribe-taker was
far worse than his committing a felony, based on the public’s perception as a flaw
in his humanity).
197 See id. at 56 (emphasis added).
198 See id.
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particular action that is of most importance.199
In this, we largely agree with Underkuffler: the accusation
suggests the person is wholly untrustworthy with important
matters, because his character has been captured, if not by evil,
then by baser interests.200 We likewise agree with her that this
point is not properly converted into a new legal definition: we
cannot wish to criminalize dispositions, however corrupt.201 The
broader definition does, however, shed light on why we are
bothered by acts that appear somewhat like corrupt actions even
when they are not, and should not be, legally categorized as such.202
They reveal the action we cannot directly observe, the turning
away.203
This conception of corruption—as a turning away from the
public good toward something else, throws into relief a central area
of confusion in contemporary corruption talk:204 what sense does it
make to say that an institution, but not its members, turn away
from its proper good, toward something else?
A. The Parts and the Whole
There are three different additive issues posited among
institutional corruption claims. First, contemporary American
“corruption talk,” especially that of legal theorists, political
scientists, and other elite commentators, is dominated by the
attempt to apply the idea of corruption to further domains and
practices.205 So corruption definitions (such as Lessig’s claim above
regarding corruption as “influence”)206 are said to be further
illuminated when applied across multiple domains.207 Second, it
has recently become common to see arguments that an institution
can be corrupt even when none of its members are corrupt.208 And
third, it has also become common to see references to some
See id.
See id. at 68.
201 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 69.
202 See generally id. at 72 (noting the powerful visceral impact of labelling
something corrupt and the relative ease with which this is done).
203 See id.
204 See id. at 139 (distinguishing evil conduct from corrupt conduct by
highlighting that corruption “threatens the entire governmental system of
reliance, trust, and shared values of which [a politician] is part.”).
205 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29.
206 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
207 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29.
208 See id. at 17.
199
200
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imagined “tipping point” at which institutions become corrupt—
that is, if just one or two members are corrupt, they are
aberrations, but if enough members are, the entire institution is
compromised.209 How do we make sense of these various claims?
One way to think about these matters is to think about the notion
of corruption as a “turning.”210
Examples from Multiple Domains: One intriguing feature of
some recent corruption arguments is their taking examples from
multiple, non-political domains.211 The question here is whether
we get additional leverage on the concept or consequences of
corruption by exploring multiple different instances.212 This is not
a novel observation.213 As Plato shows in the Euthyphro, providing
multiple instances that are said to be examples of a larger concept
(there, it is holiness or piety) does not bring one closer to a
definition of the thing itself214 (or, as Catherine Zuckert puts
matters, “knowledge is not simply analytic nor synthetic”).215 We
might be able to rule out particular things, but we cannot be
certain that we have a large enough taxonomy to draw conclusions
about the thing itself or about all instances that are examples of
the thing.
Many of the examples of undue influence that Lessig and others
provide are indeed cringe-worthy.216 But enumerating examples
(as helpful as this may be in spurring thought about definitions) is
not the same as defining.217 Being bothered is different from
understanding.218 There very well may be valid descriptive reasons
to enumerate and classify incidences of corruption in different
domains;219 this is a major task in much of the empirical literature
on corruption,220 and it can tell us things such as whether country
209 See generally id. at 18 (providing an example of a point where
democratically elected officials are unduly influenced by outside benefit).
210 Id. at 16–17 (discussing the way in which one corrupt person does not create
a corrupt institution, but rather this could be the turning point in which the
corruption takes hold).
211 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., CATHERINE H. ZUCKERT, PLATO’S PHILOSOPHERS: THE COHERENCE
OF THE DIALOGUES 639–40 (2009).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 635.
216 See, e.g., REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16.
217 Id. at 17, 18.
218 See id.
219 See generally id. at 28–29 (recounting an experiment attempting to classify
what corruption is in the domains of “politics, medicine, and consumer products.”).
220 See id.
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A has experienced more instances of corruption than country B.221
This would seem to be useful in a sheerly practical sense: where
would one wish to live? Where would one wish to engage in
philanthropic efforts? Yet if the corruption itself involves a turning
from the public good, it seems irrelevant where the turning took
place.222 A corrupt banker is functionally the same as a corrupt
politician, as a corrupt university administrator. The corruption
took place before the action. Now it may be of interest that
corruption is more common in some domains than others,223 but if
so, we have shifted our conversation to one about the
circumstances under which individuals might become corrupt. We
have neither clarified the definition nor have we absolved these
individuals.
Indeed, it is not merely officials who can be turned away from
their proper purposes, and it is not merely by committing a
criminal act that an agent can evidence a distorted orientation by
which he, operating as an official, values lower and private goods
over higher and common goods.224 If we adopt the view common in
the philosophical literature on our natural human tendency
toward corruption, perhaps we are all potentially corrupt225—but
we might only act upon that inclination in certain circumstances,
within certain institutional frameworks.226 Yet this does not make
these frameworks themselves corrupt. Despite examples offered
from multiple domains,227 we are left with the question of whether
the concept of institutional corruption makes sense.
Corrupt Institutions full of Uncorrupted People?: Another classic
matter in separating types of corruption is what one might call the
221 See generally BO ROTHSTEIN, THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT: CORRUPTION,
SOCIAL TRUST, AND INEQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (The
University of Chicago Press 2011) (detailing and comparing how corruption affects
water access in several different countries).
222 See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 68 (detailing allegations of corruption by
various politicians at different periods of time and under diverse circumstances).
223 See, e.g., Peter Rodriguez et al., Three Lenses on the Multinational
Enterprise: Politics, Corruption, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 37 J. OF
INT’L BUS. STUDIES 733, 739 (2006) (noting that “[c]orruption is quite common in
government procurement, in the provision of infrastructure services, and in
business licensing[,]” for example).
224 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 68.
225 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16; UNDERKUFFLER, supra note
27, at 68.
226 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16 (noting how a doctor might be
corrupted in the context of recommending pharmaceuticals based on benefits
received from a pharmaceutical company).
227 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29.
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“McConnell Paradox.”228 During the debate over what was then
known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill,
Senator Mitch McConnell took issue with the claim that the bill
would combat corruption.229 “How can there be corruption if no one
is corrupt?” McConnell asked, “That’s like saying the gang is
corrupt but none of the gangsters are.”230 While this rhetorical
trope is not original to Senator McConnell,231 it has served as an
effective riposte for those who would challenge regulation of any
activity that tended toward corruption.232 As Thompson has
shown, it can be rhetorically effective in some circumstances to
personify what he, Lessig, and others have described as
institutional corruption, but in other circumstances the response
to the McConnell paradox has been to repeat their definition and
to emphasize that institutional corruption does not implicate
individuals.233
The difference here may in part be a semantic one. If corruption
is represented as a “turning” then it seems only individuals can be
corrupt.234 Institutions cannot turn.235 They can be turned, but if
this is the case one might argue that they have been corrupted, not
that they are corrupt.236 In other words, there has to be some
personal agency here somewhere.237 A group of persons can have a
will, and may constitute itself in a manner that establishes
institutions to do their will or seek their good.238 Some might argue,
with Rousseau, however, that any institution that is not strictly
228 See Lawrence Lessig, Congress Can Be Corrupt Without Corrupt People,
THE
DAILY
BEAST
(Dec.
13,
2013,
5:45
AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/13/congress-can-be-corruptwithout-corrupt-people.html.
229 See Alison Mitchell, Republicans Pillory McCain in Debate Over Soft Money,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/us/republicanspillory-mccain-in-debate-over-soft-money.html.
230 Id.
231 See id.
232 See generally Lessig, Congress Can Be Corrupt Without Corrupt People,
supra note 228 (noting how a particular advocacy group has launched political
advertisements in line with McConnell’s philosophy against a politician they
believe to be corrupt).
233 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5–6; Lessig,
Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 3.
234 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 68.
235 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5–6.
236 See id. at 15–16 (emphasis added).
237 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 6.
238 See generally Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 16
(providing an example of how medical institutions prioritize the demands of their
industry in limiting transparency and accountability).
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acting on orders from the people who have constituted it, which has
deviated from its purpose whether by an individual’s nefarious
designs or through inattention of the people, has been corrupted.239
But, if so, it has still been corrupted through the actions of
individuals.240 Properly speaking, there are not really agentively
independent institutions at all in social contract theories such as
Rousseau’s.241 Nor do such institutions exist in contemporary
rational choice literature;242 when motives are attributed to groups
of people, they are almost always attributed not to institutions but
to organizations, deliberately constituted by individuals to
facilitate deliberation and pursue common ends.243
This may be why references to institutional corruption are
scarce in the older political philosophy literature.244 It is much
more common to see references to the corruption of a people.245 If
one wishes to excuse individuals, this may be a more accurate
approach.246 We can become corrupt without necessarily being
aware of it; in fact, if all of us become corrupt together, then we
may be too compromised to see the corruption in others.247 When
Machiavelli, for instance, presents instances of corrupt peoples, it
is perhaps easy for the modern reader to envision a world
constituted of tiny principalities, some of which have the bad
fortune to be made up of thoroughly rotten individuals.248 Yet, it is
239 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 15, 18 (Roger G.
Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., Bedford St. Martins 1978) (1762).
240 See id. at 15.
241 See Edward W. Younkins, Rousseau’s “General Will” and Well-ordered
Society,
LE
QUEBECIOS
LIBRE
(July
15,
2005),
http://www.quebecoislibre.org/05/050715-16.htm.
242 See Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder, Congress and American Democracy:
Institutions and Performance, in INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY XIX, XX
(Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).
243 See, e.g., Jack Knight, Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing
Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 95, 96 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1995); Douglas C. North, Five
Propositions about Social Change, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 15, 15–18,
20 (Jack Night & Itai Sened eds., 1995); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF
CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 5, 10 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds.,
1995); DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT 15 (1995); Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder, supra
note 242, at xx.
244 CORRUPTION, EXPANDING THE FOCUS 8 (Manuhuia Barcham et al. eds.,
Australian National University Press 2012).
245 Id.
246 See, e.g., id. at 68–69.
247 See, e.g., id.
248 See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 3–28, 35, 42,
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harder to imagine similarly implicating a modern nation of over
300 million people, especially when the imaginer is one of the 300
million. But perhaps this is a possibility that would be more
consistent with the manner in which the term was used in the
classic literature.249
This corruption of a people may not, however, be what Lessig
wishes to talk about. Lessig’s definition makes frequent reference
to replacing criminal quid pro quo with a certain type of
influence.250 We would suggest, rather, that his definition confuses
corruption for influence.251 While an honest politician will indeed
avoid any quid pro quo agreements, no politician can avoid
influence, indeed, multiple influences from myriad sources.252 He
may turn away from his proper purposes in response to a bad
influence, but that does not make influence itself corruption: it
would make the individual agent corrupt.253 Indeed, Lessig’s
definition nods to this fact by specifying the corrupting influence
as occurring within “an economy of influence.”254 The phrase
implies that politicians, and other institutional agents, operate
within systems of people creating and trading influences.255 In her
discussion of parties and corruption, Nancy Rosenblum comments,
aptly, “[n]othing is more elusive than influence (except ‘undue’).”256
Lessig’s definition gets caught on this point.257 The influences his
definition labels as corrupting, the influences which allegedly
entwine politicians in institutional corruption, are those that
“weaken the effectiveness of the institution.”258 This specification
does not do much to reduce the elusiveness of what counts as
improper influence, since this leaves the difficult empirical task of
determining the conditions under which an institution operates
most effectively.259 (For example, the definition implies that public
trust is required for the proper functioning of these institutions:
but what amount of public trust of the institution allows it to

49, 55 (Max Lerner trans., 1950) (providing examples of corruption).
249 See id.; CORRUPTION, supra note 244, at 8.
250 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2, 15.
251 See supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text.
252 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 15.
253 Contra id. at 2.
254 See id.
255 See id.
256 Rosenblum, supra note 161, at 246.
257 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2.
258 Id.
259 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5.
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function most effectively?260 What degree of public distrust, or
trust, hinders it? Mustn’t the institutional corruption theorists
believe some distrust will help our institutions operate more
effectively, or else they themselves would be damaging these
institutions?)261
Distinguishing between those influences that enhance and those
that hamper an institution’s effectiveness requires us to face, even
beyond the empirical difficulties, the deeper, and philosophically
prior, difficulty of understanding the purpose of the institution in
question.262 This difficulty is philosophically prior because it is only
in light of these proper purposes that the notion of an institution’s
“effectiveness” gains any meaning at all.263 It follows from our
above claims that institutions are not corrupt except insofar as
they are corrupted by individual agents;264 and if this happens
under corrupting influences, we are still left to ponder which
influences help and which hinder the individuals in serving the
institution’s proper ends.265
Corrupt Practices, or, the Theseus’s Ship Problem: Before
turning directly to the matter of institutional purposes, let us
consider a weaker variant of the McConnell paradox:266 while
perhaps the institution cannot be corrupted without its members
being corrupt, is it possible for it to be corrupted without all of them
being so? Perhaps one or two corrupt individuals may not be
symptomatic of a corrupt institution, but once the number of
demonstrably corrupt individuals reaches a certain level, we might
then start describing the institution itself as being corrupt. This
is a convenient and common shorthand. For instance, Democratic
politicians characterized the Republican-led Congress as being
“the most corrupt Congress in history” in the run-up to the 2006
election.267 Did they mean that the institution was corrupt, or was
this merely a way of saying that a large number of individual
politicians were corrupt? Most likely (especially since these words

260 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2; Thompson, Two
Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5–6.
261 See id.
262 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 4–5.
263 See id. at 5.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
267 See Thomas Edsall, Republicans Say Mollohan Should Quit Ethics Post,
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/07/AR2006040701800.html.
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were spoken by fellow members of the Congress who did not
radically alter Congressional rules or practices when they gained
control)268 it was the latter.
If I purchase a bag of grapes, and one of them is rotten, I can
easily remove that grape and eat the others. There comes some
point, however, when I have gone through the bag finding rotten
grapes, that I give up and discard the bag, concluding that the lot
of them is rotten. Perhaps I do not mean that they all are, only
that the effort it would take to find a fresh one is not worth it. It
is a matter of the degree of precision I have in my description. This
is another classic problem in philosophy, of nobler origin than the
McConnell paradox: the Theseus’s ship problem (described by
Plutarch) or the Heraclitean claim, presented in Plato’s Cratylus,
that a person can never step in the same river twice.269 At what
point does change in the parts constitute a transformation of the
whole? The parallel here is that we cannot with precision identify
a point at which individual parts can corrupt the whole, although
even a small number of parts change the character of it.270 A
further parallel, in modern terminology, might be made to
computer parts; we say that a computer drive has become
corrupted when only a small part of it fails to work properly. A
problem with one small part can destroy the whole.
This variant view of institutional corruption may be more
promising than claiming that an institution can be corrupted
without its members being so. One broken plank on a ship cannot
break another plank. Rot can, however, spread from one piece of
fruit to another if the two are next to each other. This may be a
more accurate way of thinking about institutional corruption.271
One corrupt individual amongst a body of the uncorrupt may be
cast out. If the corrupt proliferate in number past a certain point,
however, they may influence the practices of the group.272
To see why this is so, we must distinguish between singly
corrupt acts or persons and corruption as a practice.273 In fact, one
268 See generally id. (discussing how Republican House leaders charged that
the GOP has fostered a “culture of corruption”).
269 See THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 421, 439 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961)[hereinafter PLATO]; Plutarch, Theseus, THE
INTERNET
CLASSICS
ARCHIVE
(1994–2009),
http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/theseus.html.
270 See PLATO, supra note 269, at 423; Plutarch, Theseus, supra note 269.
271 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 116, at 15–16.
272 See id.
273 See id. at 17 (discussing the different effects of each type of corruption,
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reason citizens worry about corruption scandals, in addition to
whatever injustice they directly sow, is their power to “cause
Contemporary theorists of
scandal” in the older sense.274
corruption are quite concerned with the fact that corrupt actions
and agents damage the people’s faith in their government.275 A
citizen’s moderate skepticism about government and governmental
officials is, however, healthy.276 Distinct from this concern is the
worry that singly corrupt actions and individually corrupt agents
encourage others in like positions to act as they have acted, to
become like them.277 Corruption displayed is corrupting.278
There are two levels at which the corrupting power of corruption
can operate.279 First, human beings are often inspired to act
according to the models they witness.280 The corrupt agent sets up
a model for any others who witness the corruption, whether this
behavior be publicly known or not, whether it be taken by a witness
as exceptional or as a practice involving multiple individuals.281
Thus an infectious tendency belongs to corruption, as to all human
behaviors.282 A corrupt individual corrupts other individuals.283
Second, a corrupt pattern corrupts the norm. Human beings act
always in a milieu of socially established norms.284 The witness
may take the corrupt action or agent as presenting a social norm,
as indicating “how things are done.”285 When this presentation is
more or less accurate, corruption has become not just an
individual and institutional).
274 See, e.g., Paul Wadell, The Dangerous Power of a Scandalous Life, THE
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 14, 1997), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-0914/news/9709140300_1_mother-teresa-scandal-goodness.
275 See, e.g., REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 9; Thompson, Two Concepts of
Corruption, supra note 116, at 15–16.
276 See generally, Kevin Williamson, Defining ‘Corruption’ Corruptly, NAT’L
REVIEW
(May
9,
2015,
3:04
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/418158/defining-corruption-corruptlykevin-d-williamson (discussing the inevitability of moral corruptions).
277 See THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS PT.
II 520–21 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1917) (1485).
278 See id. See generally Williamson, supra note 272 (discussing public officials’
use of corruption talk to perpetuate “corruption writ large” without crossing the
line into “legally actionable corruption”).
279 See infra notes 280–85.
280 See Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality
and Corruption, 70 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 136, 140 (2005).
281 See id.
282 Id.
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 Id.
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exceptional single action and possibly contagious, but customary
and epidemic.286 This presentation of a pattern of corruption
involving many individuals is more powerfully corrupting, more
scandalous, than are scattered corrupt individuals.287 One must
make oneself an exception not to participate; failing to go along
with the pattern may seem either supererogatory or naïve.288
If we take the corrupt act or behavior as “how things are done,”
what is the social rule by which we judge the violation as a
violation?289 In the case of individual corruption in a healthy
system, the corrupt action or agent is recognized as exceptional,
whereas in the case of corruption-as-a-practice, the individually
corrupt action or agent is seen as normal (average), and the norm
itself is seen as exceptional though still operative as norm,
operative in thought insofar as we recognize corruption as
corrupt.290 In such a case, there must be two simultaneous and
conflicting set of social rules, where one is inherently parasitic on
the other.291 It is an unstable situation, threatening the survival of
the official norm.292 For those still in possession of the higher norm,
who still recognize corruption even when it has become established
practice, the situation asks for the return of the true and rightful
king, the restoration of the legal order.293
What happens if the official norm is totally lost? Individual
corruption and corruption as a practice must therefore be
distinguished from a third type, namely corruption as loss of the
ideal, in which society no longer honors the normatively primary
“official” institution on which corruption as practice is parasitic,
286 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 17 (quoting
Charles “Buddy” Roemer as saying “It’s the system that’s corrupt. . . . People
within the system can’t imagine the system functioning any other way.”).
287 See id.
288 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124.
289 See, e.g., You & Khagram, supra note 280, at 140.
290 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124; You & Khagram, supra note 280,
at 140. See generally Rod Blagojevich, Former Illinois Governor, Sentenced to 14
Years on Corruption Charges, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rod-blagojevich-former-illinoisgovernor-sentenced-to-14-years-on-corruptioncharges/2011/12/07/gIQA1tAHdO_story.html (reporting a former politician’s
conviction and sentencing for corruption charges).
291 See Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 14.
292 See id.
293 See generally Maarten de Jong et al., Eliminating Corruption in Our
Engineering/Construction Industry, 9 LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT IN
ENGINEERING 105, 108 (July 2009) (calling for changes in the construction
industry as part of an effort to combat perceived corruption).
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such that bribery, etc., is not only “the way things are done,” but is
considered—from the viewpoint of socially established rules—the
way things are properly done. It is no longer seen as corrupt.294
B. The Need for an Ideal (or, What’s a Heaven For?)
All of this brings us to the question of what, in fact, institutions
are. Lessig’s definition of corruption requires that we identify in
advance for any institution what its purposes are and which
sources and degrees of influence on its agents are helpful for these
purposes and which are not.295 Similarly, the framework we have
posited here presumes that there is a public purpose in which we
are engaged; we have constructed institutional, public roles and
assigned them certain functions that are different, and differently
understood, than our personal desires and tasks, and these public
roles make sense as serving goods of the institutions of which the
roles are, by definition, subservient.296
These functions can serve as an ideal—they are constructs to
which we attach rules (both formal and informal), responsibilities,
and expectations.297 These roles are what Searle refers to as a
“status function.”298 Consider, for instance, the role of “senator.” If
an individual politician has turned away from doing what a
senator should do, we might (with Thompson)299 identify this as a
particular type of corruption (a type that Thompson, as we have
noted above, identifies as institutional corruption, but which is
distinct from claiming that the larger institution, such as
Congress, is corrupt).300 This claim can only be made, however, if
we have an ideal of what a “senator” should be and do. But this is
different from saying that the institution is corrupt.
294 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124; You & Khagram, supra note 280,
at 140. Perhaps one might say it no longer is corrupt. To conceive of the social
norms themselves as corrupt requires appeal to some other norm viewed as a
higher or more fundamental norm—a more supreme social norm or a norm not
socially recognized at all. See LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124.
295 See Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 2; Thompson, supra
note 122, at 4–5, 7 n.7. But see Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116,
at 7, 16.
296 See generally Thompson, supra note 122, at 4–5, 7 n.7 (explaining that if a
public figure is dependent on anything other than “the people” it is corruption).
But see Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 7, 16.
297 See generally John R. Searle, What is an Institution?, 1 J. INST. ECON. 1, 7
(2005).
298 See id.
299 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 6, 18.
300 Id.

DO NOT DELETE

374

5/16/2016 6:38 PM

ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

In this sense, the institutional role in question is that of the
“senator.” Yet one can only be a senator within a larger institution,
such as (obviously) the Senate (again, a point made by Searle).301
And the Senate, in turn, is also comprised of a set of rules,
responsibilities, and norms.302 In one sense, it is these that
constitute the institution of the Senate; in another sense (following
from our point above regarding rational choice theorists’
distinctions between organizations and institutions),303 the Senate
is an organization, a body of 100 people. And what are we really
talking about if we say that the Senate is ‘corrupt’? We would
contend that corruption of the group has clear, public meaning,
while corruption of the institution apart from the group is far
trickier, lacking a clear, public meaning. The rules exist for a
purpose (which may be good or bad), but they are in themselves
value-neutral.304 We can only talk about their corruption if we
specify a purpose behind the rules, responsibilities, and norms, and
then discuss their failures to conduce to that purpose. If the rules
are inadequate to enable the people to achieve that purpose, we
might talk about improper fit. If the members, on the other hand,
have flouted the rules, then we might allege corruption at the
individual level.
Influence and Dependence: Lessig claims that we can skirt the
purposes argument about Congress by simply recognizing the
“improper dependency” of Congressional campaign procedures on
donors,305 where the dependency is recognized as improper because
the dependency was supposed to be, according to Madison in
Federalist #52, “the people alone.”306
This is questionable as a descriptive claim, as the quotation from
Federalist #52 is taken out of context.
Madison is there
emphasizing that the House of Representatives was not to be
dependent upon the state legislatures.307 We are reminded that
there is a much more mundane sense in which the House is

301 See generally Searle, supra note 297, at 10–11 (explaining that subgroups
and roles within subgroups can exists within larger groups, using families as an
example).
302 Rules
and
Procedure,
UNITED
STATES
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Rules_and_Procedure
_vrd.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
303 Supra note 243 and accompanying text.
304 See Rules and Procedure, supra note 302.
305 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 245.
306 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 483 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press 1945).
307 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 483 (James Madison).
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dependent upon the people alone: its members were (prior to the
17th amendment) the only officials of the federal government
directly elected, rather than elected or appointed by other
officials.308 We do not need to like the influence of donors upon
elections; still, we should recognize as controversial rather than as
obvious, Lessig’s argument that members of Congress should not
rely on citizen donations in their campaigns.309 Lessig’s example
therefore fails to show that we can identify improper influence
without appealing to purposes of an institution.310
Two points about this project undermine, we contend, the
helpfulness of Lessig’s definition of corruption. First, while
improper influence is meant to be illuminated by the purposes of
our public institutions, those purposes are often just as elusive and
contested as the idea of undue influence.311 Thus, ultimately, the
definition of institutional corruption is un-illuminating outside a
discussion of these institutional purposes.312 Second, governmental
institutions in our democratic republic seem designed to respond
to this human situation of un-clarity about ultimate purposes of
our most important institutions.313 They do this by allowing—
within a constitutional framework that imposes limits as well as
creating places for debate and decision—the play of influences in
the country to determine the particular purposes to be sought.314
This we call politics.315 Thus, ultimately, the definition of
institutional corruption seems either to shortchange, or simply
challenge, the constitutional system as a framework for politics,
308 See The People of the People’s House, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U. S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
309 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 157.

310 See generally id. (the primary method of campaign finance being through
corporate donations in the hopes of influencing outcomes, which requires a
corrupt institution because the individuals are corrupted in their use of power
within the institution).
311 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 8–9, 15–16 (demonstrating how
corruption should be easily identifiable within a public institution given the
purpose of the institutions existence, however it can be blurred or unclear to the
public eye whether a wrong has been done); Lessig, Institutional Corruption,
supra note 116, at 8–9; Thompson, supra note 122, at 5.
312 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 19–20 (demonstrating, for example,
that receiving gifts from the Crown corrupted members of Parliament because it
pulled their focus from the good of the people and towards the good of the king);
Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 14–15.
313 See generally REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 19 (explaining that the
Constitution was framed in a way which was believed to alleviate the corruption
of foreign powers).
314 See Thompson, supra note 122, at 5–6.
315 See id.
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which is supposed to involve contesting opinions or “influences.”316
These two points fit together in an important way: it is by
having discussions of purposes within the framework that the
framework is best maintained.317 That is to say, our being a
political community is constituted in discussions in which we,
especially through our intermural disagreements, define what
these purposes are.318 And this is not a once and for all affair: we
continue to constitute ourselves as a political community as we
recontest our various consensuses and deliberate about how to
apply our vaguely and imperfectly agreed upon purposes in new
situations.319
Thus, the proper response to Lessig’s definition of institutional
corruption is, we believe, a call to further discuss together the
purposes of our institutions.320 There is certainly nothing wrong
with such discussions. Yet we fear that broad acceptance of
Lessig’s definition of institutional corruption would hinder this
discussion in two ways: first, the definition purports to be able to
diagnose a major problem of our institutions without our needing
to dirty ourselves with the more fundamental discussion of
purposes;321 second, it uses a term with powerful criminal
connotations to describe politics and its inevitable play of
influences, thus threatening to cast out of the discussion those who
disagree about the purpose of the institution, just as we cast out
from political life officials caught taking bribes.322
Institutions, then, seem insufficiently powerful to be said to be
corrupt.323 They may fail, they may not fit our needs, they may not
be updated to account for changing circumstances, they may be
subverted by individuals pursuing their own private interests, or
316 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2; Thompson, Two
Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 6.
317 See Thompson, supra note 122, at 5–6; see also Lessig, Institutional
Corruptions, supra note 116, at 8 (noting that identifying when a tendency
becomes institutional corruption, one must identify a baseline).
318 See Thompson, supra note 122, at 5–6; see also Lessig, Institutional
Corruptions, supra note 116, at 7–8 (discussing the types of corruption that are
done within the political community and the purposes they serve).
319 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 7–8.
320 See id. at 2.
321 See id. at 16, 19.
322 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 226–27 (clear corruption within an
institution on the most basic level can threaten the discussion of institutional
corruption).
323 See generally id. at 17 (demonstrating that because of the reliance on
individuals, the institution itself is not corrupted given the power is with
individuals and their actions within the institution).
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they may calcify, becoming overly complex or opaque.324 They can
be turned away.325 But they have no agency—they cannot turn
without someone turning them, either through malice, sloth, or
self-interest.326 If we want to talk about this, we cannot separate
institutions from individuals, groups of individuals, or people.327 It
is they who may be corrupt in such instances.328 And yet, if we
want to make a secondary point—that an institution has been
corrupted, we can only do this by positing an ideal from which that
institution has been turned—an idealized institution up to which
we hold our actual ones.329 Perhaps this means that the actual will
always fail to match the ideal, but at the least we might be able to
talk about the distance between the two.330
This, finally, poses a problem for discourse. What we are saying
is that any claim about institutional corruption is a regime
argument: an argument about what purpose our association
should serve, what the common good is.331 Thus, allegations of
institutional corruption seem to be reduced to accusing other
people of disagreeing with us about the common good.332 It would
be better for us simply to say so, and to admit the ideals we are
asserting. We are holding the individuals in, say, the Senate, up
against our idealized notion of what the Senate is supposed to be:
a concept of “the Senate” which may have existed at some point in
time, may have been articulated in the Constitution or the
Federalist Papers, or may exist in the popular imagination (say, as
324 See generally ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1130–31 (Richard
McKeon ed., Random House 1968) (1941) (discussing how a household is the basic
form of a political institution and the way in which circumstances can alter within
a household, be it a possession becoming something capable of action or an actor
failing to produce).
325 See id.
326 See id.
327 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 16–17 (showing how institutional
corruption sometimes cannot be separated from individual corruption given that
people are what make the institution corrupt).
328 Id.
329 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 8 (noting that
identifying when a tendency becomes institutional corruption, one must identify
a baseline).
330 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 278 (discussing how even within a
party the ideal and reality can vary).
331 See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing
Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1395–96, 1421–22 (2013) (arguing that
corruption cannot be precisely defined by the court without also developing a
theory of representative democracy—a theory which is beyond the scope of the
court’s powers).
332 See id. at 1392.

DO NOT DELETE

378

5/16/2016 6:38 PM

ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

a consequence of watching Mr. Smith Goes to Washington).333 Or,
to take matters a step further, we may, with Quirk and Binder,
prefer to hold as an ideal a loosely defined good and be flexible
about the institutional features that will be necessary to achieve
that.334 But, it is this construction in language and public discourse
that drives our debate. We need to talk about what this regime
looks like.
And if we don’t all share this ideal or norm? If, for instance, one
person’s “Senate” is a sacrosanct constitutional treasure, while for
others it is a reminder of slavery and undemocratic privilege? How
do we proceed? For Thompson, we can still find common ground
by stating our acceptance of procedures—that is, we might reach a
grudging acceptance that we will, at least, allow majority rule or
some other decision rule serve as the institutional means of cutting
short our regime argument.335
But this acceptance is not
necessarily facilitated by branding a person, or a person’s
practices, or even the organization to which one belongs, as
corrupt.336
At this point in the analysis of institutions it seems that to allege
that an institution, in the proper sense, is corrupt is either to argue
that it has been corrupted, by individuals who are themselves at
least agents of corruption, that it is entirely too broad (a shorthand
for categorizing things that one does not care for), or that it is
without meaning at all, simply an epithet to toss at one’s foes.
One final point on this matter: one might respond to our
argument by noting that we have inserted one academic definition
(that of “institutions”) and branded it the “correct” one, and used
that to brand another academic definition (of “institutional
corruption”) as “wrong.”337 This is not our intent here. Language
changes over time.338 It is beyond our means here to address the
question of why language changes (whether naturally or through
deliberate decisions by individuals), but we do not mean to suggest
333 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010); see also Hellman,
supra note 331, at 1394 (noting that what we see as corruption of legislators
depends on what we believe to be proper “decisionmaking [sic] by elected
officials”).
334 See Quirk & Binder, supra note 242, at 527.
335 See Thompson, Ethics in Congress, supra note 112, at 28.
336 See generally id. (noting that the main difference between corruption and
public purpose is whether private interests, regardless of whether they are those
of individuals, contentious factions, or mass movements, bypass democratic
processes).
337 See supra notes 123–27, 309–310 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
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that one cannot redefine a term.339 We mean, instead, to note that
if this is the task, it should be owned up to, and the reason for that
task—the end—should also be specified.
III.

WHAT’S THE HARM?

The above discussion documents a very broad political agenda—
one that goes far beyond the initial impetus for this effort, the
Supreme Court’s skeptical approach toward regulating political
contributions.340 There are many valid reasons for Americans to
consider changes in our campaign finance laws, and one of us has
written frequently in support of various reform proposals.341 Many
of Lessig’s proposals, when shorn of their “corruption”
framework,342 are welcome additions to our political discussion.
The question is not whether we should have a serious discussion
about reform, but rather what sort of frame we should use in that
discussion. As we have sought to document above, we find the
“corruption” frame to be problematic as a theoretical premise. In
addition to its theoretical problems, however, we also find the
“corruption” frame to be objectionable rhetorically; the problems
with the rhetoric of corruption derive from the theoretical problems
outlined above.
First, an accusation of corruption seems to impugn the whole
person in a way that undermines dialogue.343 As we have shown,
corruption is not an easily scalable concept; contrary to Lessig’s
claims, it is difficult to claim that being “a little bit corrupt” is a
sustainable equilibrium.344 It is also difficult to sustain the
individual vs. institutional dichotomy; even if we know what the
339 See JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN
CIVILIZATION 104 (2010) (“One sees the role of the vocabulary in the activities of
revolutionary and reformist movements. They try to get hold of the vocabulary
in order to alter the system of status functions. . . . [W]e get away with it to the
extent that we can get other people to accept it.”).
340 See ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, POLITICAL ADVERTISING VOUCHERS FOR
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES: WHAT DIFFERENCE COULD THEY MAKE? 23 (2005)
(discussing the ways in which the court has broached the subject of campaign
reform); see also supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
341 See, e.g., BOATRIGHT, supra note 340, at 23; Robert G. Boatright & Michael
J. Malbin, Political Contribution Tax Credits and Citizen Participation, 33 AM.
POL. RES. 787, 788–89 (2005) (discussing a study on tax credits and the political
interest and contribution gathered through their use). The other author of this
paper is skeptical of these proposals.
342 See, e.g., Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 6.
343 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 4–6.
344 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 4, 15, 19.

DO NOT DELETE

380

5/16/2016 6:38 PM

ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

articulators of institutional corruption theories want to say, they
are still not actually saying it; we bring our prior understandings
of corruption to the table.345 These two problems make allegations
of corruption problematic in maintaining civility of political
discourse.346 One cannot expect an individual who has been
accused of corruption or of being a participant in an allegedly
corrupt institution to be an eager partner in a sincere discussion of
alternatives.347
Second, since this rhetoric assumes but does not articulate our
differences about the functions of our institution, we risk
exacerbating polarization and diminishing our ability to
understand opposing viewpoints.348 We have argued that claims
about corruption succeed only if there is a shared reference point—
an example, real or symbolic, of an uncorrupted institution. If there
is no such shared starting point, then those making claims about
corruption effectively talk past each other.349
Third, with a much broadened concept of corruption thrown
around in public rhetoric, we run into the ‘boy who cried wolf’
problem.350 In his earlier work, Thompson recognized this.351 He
describes the manner in which corruption allegations became a
political tool in the waning days of the Democratic Party’s fortyyear long rule in the House of Representatives.352 Both sides, he
argues, took part in a “cycle of accusation” in which each accused
the other of corruption.353 As a result of this, he claims, the charges
lost their moral authority, and it became difficult to separate
individual from institutional corruption and major ethical
violations from minor ones.354 It is easy to see this taking place
now, outside of Congress.355 A big theory of corruption, especially
345 See id. at 4–6 (defining individual and institutional corruption by focusing
on what one would gain by way of the corrupt conduct, yet still not defining what
corruption is).
346 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48 (noting how each
side of the aisle trades corruption allegations for political purposes).
347 See generally id. (noting how accusations of ethical violation lead Congress
to stop taking such charges seriously).
348 See id.
349 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at xii.
350 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 47–48.
353 Id. at 48.
354 Id.
355 See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 6, at 42; Erik Schmeltzer, Yes, the Tone of the
Sanders Campaign Matters, and Yes, It’s Too Ugly, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
4, 2016, 9:03 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-schmeltzer/yes-the-tone-
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one that seems to implicate all of us, can make identifying the
egregious cases difficult, and can force everyone to choose sides.356
One might argue that talking about corruption can, in limited
doses, be helpful.357 As Cain writes, allegations of corruption can
be an effective deterrent, even if they are unproven.358 Political
candidates may shy away from questionable activities not because
they fear legal sanction but because just being accused of being
corrupt may harm them.359 But if everyone is calling everyone else
corrupt, the charge may be less effective.360
And fourth, it draws us into calling for solutions out of
proportion to the problems. When taken away from the individual
context, in which the meaning of the accusation can be pinned
down to particular events and agents, claims about corruption
often become “epic” in nature.361 One line of thought (drawn from
Montesquieu and Rousseau) holds that corruption is a virtually
unstoppable process.362 This may or may not be true. It is,
however, a process that seems much larger than day-to-day
politics.363 Many of the “solutions” that tend to be proposed,
however, seem rather small in nature.364 Lessig recognizes this.365
He closes Republic, Lost with a mixture of conventional and quite
radical proposals—starting with clean elections, overturning
Citizens United, having more primary challenges, and a call for the
president to demand substantial Congressional reform,366 and from
of-the-sande_b_9601978.html.
356 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48; see also CAIN,
supra note 6, at 42 (noting that pressures from the press and political
organizations make accusations of impropriety a divisive and effective weapon).
357 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48 (noting that
when talk of corruption is pervasive, it can damage institutions like Congress).
358 CAIN, supra note 6, at 42
359 See generally id. (noting that “[a]llegations of impropriety can have more
political value than truth, especially in hotly contested situations.”).
360 THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48.
361 See id.
362 See JOSE MARI MARAVALL & ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE
OF LAW 47 (2003).
363 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 1–2.
364 See, e.g., REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 250.
365 See id.
366 Id. at 272, 276, 285. The precise proposal here is difficult to summarize
succinctly. Lessig proposes a “regent president” who will take office and refuse to
sign any legislation until Congress radically reforms itself. This proposal is not
entirely dissimilar to the concept of ethics tribunals, or having an outside
organization enforce anti-corruption standards upon an institutionally corrupt
body that is unable to do so itself. One might even trace this idea to Rousseau’s
description in the Social Contract of tribunals. Id. at 288; THOMPSON, ETHICS IN
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there moving on to calling for a new constitutional convention.367
It seems that one must pick sides: On the one hand, if we truly
have a crisis of epic, institutional corruption, then the dramatic
solutions should, as in Rousseau, be embraced.368 We do not
endorse this idea, but it seems like the logical conclusion from a
larger theory and tipping point rhetoric. On the other hand, if we
have something smaller, more manageable, perhaps we can be
more polite and talk about adjusting the mechanics.369 But it seems
hard to advocate both. Moreover, if the rhetoric has been used for
the purpose of alleging that other institutions are also riddled with
this new, broader sense of corruption, we might need to advocate
similar proposals for radical change in many other areas.370 Should
we refound the academy, or the banking industry? The lack of
radical suggestions for these other areas undermines the claim
that this is a comprehensive, and not merely a political, theory.371
Moreover, accusations of amorphous widespread “institutional”
corruption not tied to individual agency seem to become epic and
trap us into advocating unhelpfully epic responses.372
Despite the problems we have always had in defining it, the
concept of corruption has a long and rich history. There are, in
addition, many similarly useful terms and frames that have been
presented in looking at the role of money and self-interest in
politics.373 “Corrosion,” “distortion,” “influence,” and other terms
have been used without either the scalability problems, the
individual/institutional problems, or the pretense that a grand
theory or epic accusation is being developed.374 There is no reason
not to continue to employ such terms. Veteran campaign finance
lawyer Robert Bauer has written about the unprecedented nature
of contemporary campaign expenditures and the novel role of large
campaign donors, while at the same time making it clear that

CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 131.
367 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 293.
368 See id. at 305 (showing the expansive challenges posed by taking on
institutional corruption and strategies to attack it).
369 Although as Cain notes, it can become hard in such circumstances to
separate reforms that aim to reduce corruption from reforms that just seem like
good ideas. See CAIN, supra note 6 at 7, 40.
370 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 162–63.
371 See generally MUTCH, supra note 55, at 165 (reporting that observers have
noted Wall Street’s increased influence on elections).
372 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48.
373 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 18–19.
374 Id.
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“corruption” has nothing to do with his description.375 As we have
seen, Mutch, La Raja and Schaffner, and Cain also take up this
basic point; there is much one might object to in contemporary
politics, but that does not make those things corrupt; subsuming
them under that rubric cheapens the term.376 Whether one agrees
with the sentiments of these pieces or not, whether the language
chosen in them was adopted with the same concerns in mind that
we have, they show that we can have a heated discussion about
what American politics and our public purpose more broadly
should be without distorting—some might say corrupting—our
language to fit vague notions of what might appeal to five men in
black robes.377

375 See Robert Bauer, The New Donors, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Apr. 15,
2015), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2015/04/new-donor/.
376 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 163; LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 52, at 152;
MUTCH, supra note 55, at 184, 193.
377 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 142–44 (1976) (We say “men” here because the Buckley and Citizens United
majorities included no women; so presumably the female members of the Court
do not need convincing).

